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Abstract
The paper examines democracy and secularism in Malaysia, a state rooted in Islam, and how it has been
implemented in a country with a majority Muslim population. It briefly outlines how Islam was brought
to the region and how British colonialism was able to implement secularism and democratic practices
in such a way that religion was not wholeheartedly erased. Indeed, peaceful decolonization combined
with a history of accommodating elites served to promote a newly independent Malaysia, to create a
constitutional democracy which declares Islam as the religion of the Federation, and simultaneously
religious freedom. Despite the constitution, the United Malays National Organization, UMNO, Malaysia’s
ruling party for 61 years, managed to cap democracy through a variety of methods, including enraging
ethnic tensions and checking electoral competitiveness. Growing public discontent from such actions
resulted in Islamic Revivalist movements and increased Islamization at the expense of secular values.
UMNO’s 2018 electoral loss to the Alliance of Hope party (PH) suggests a new commitment to democracy
and reform, which if carried out, will likely result in a return to secular norms with Islamic elements that
still maintain religious freedom rights and democratic practices that have, over the last two decades, been
called into question.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There exists a widespread belief that Islam and democ-
racy cannot coexist, and since modernity is considered
a defining aspect of democracy, modernity and Islam
are also incompatible. Malaysia has historically func-
tioned as evidence against this notion as it enforces a
constitutional democracy with Islam as the religion of
the federation. Consequently, it is considered a model
by the West that should be emulated by other southern
countries. This provokes the question: how have democ-
racy and Islam taken form and interacted in Malaysian
politics and society historically and presently, and will
they be able to continue to coexist alongside one another
in the future?
The relationship between Islam and democracy
within Malaysia is a complex one that evolved as a
result of a unique and multicultural history. Indeed,
Malaysia’s ability to integrate religion, secularism, and
modernity into a successfully functioning government
within a highly pluralist society has resulted from the
meeting of three major civilizations (Indian, Chinese,
and European) and two colonial systems. Malaysia ex-
perienced peaceful decolonization, which, along with
a history of accommodating elites, resulted in an in-
dependent state that kept intact many of the demo-
cratic processes and ideologies implemented under
colonial rule, specifically secularism. Therefore, it is
Malaysia’s unique history and interactions that have
allowed democracy and Islam to function alongside one
another. Nonetheless, research into Malaysia’s history
and politics reveal discrepancies between democratic
ideals and actual policy.
Indeed, the relationship between democracy and reli-
gion has not been without tension, and these tensions
have become increasingly strained with Islam Revival-
ist movements. The dissatisfaction with the former rul-
ing political party, United Malays National Organiza-
tion, resulted in them further limiting democracy and
appeasing the public by enacting policies and legis-
lation promoting Islam. These actions implicated the
semi-democratic and secular state, calling into ques-
tion non-Muslims and Muslims who advocate for re-
ligious freedom’s role in society. Oppositional parties,
political movements, UMNO’s leniency on Islamic le-
gal rulings, and their employment of tactics that limit
democracy call into question if such a pluralist, secular
society can continue. Therefore, to examine the relation-
ship between Islam and democracy in Malaysia, we
must first understand its rich history and interactions
Ashton Word
as well as the government and public sphere since the
country’s independence in 1957. Furthermore, we must
investigate the political spheres to discover why we see
increased backing for an Islamic State. Through these
investigations, we will also gain insight into the reason-
ing behind the 2018 election, where Alliance of Hope
(PH) unseated UMNO as the ruling party. While it is
yet to be determined if PH will maintain its campaign
promises, which are characteristic of a democracy, the
party’s peaceful transition into government and its ac-
cordance with democratic credentials thus far are hope-
ful signs that Malaysia will become more democratic.
In the short term, Islamic revivalist movements will
continue. In the long-term, with the promised reform,
accountability, and ousting of the corrupt UMNO and
National Front Party (BN) coalition, it is reasonable to
assume the call for an Islamic state and society will
be minimized as the people’s faith in a secular gov-
ernment is restored. Consequently, Malaysia can find
a middle-ground where Islam and democracy can co-
exist peacefully alongside one another. Although the
relationship between Islam and state has not been as
harmonious as the West and Malaysia itself would have
us believe, the country continues to strive to establish
itself as a model where the two can coincide amicably.
2 ISLAM COMES TO THE MALAY WORLD
Some think that Islam came to Malaysia via traders
and merchants who traveled through the Malay
Archipelago and may have inhabited some ports be-
tween the 10th and 17th centuries. Others believe that
Sufis brought Islam to the region. Another possibility
is that indigenous Malay travelers brought the religion
back with them from the Middle East. Either way, the
arrival of Islam in the pre-colonial Malay world resulted
in numerous critical sociological changes, especially in
terms of spirituality, intellectual contribution, and the
establishment of a new social order grounded in Sharia.
Sufis preached to the Malay people, increasing society’s
overall spirituality and turned them away from mythol-
ogy to the belief in one God. The intellectual contribu-
tion of Islam in the region was paramount, establishing
a social order known as KERAJAAN (a fused church
with the state). At the heart of KERAJAAN was and is
Shariah, which was enacted holistically, socially, legally,
and politically. Indeed, Islam changed the whole of the
Malay realm, imbuing it with an Islamic worldview1.
3 BRITISH COLONIALISM
In the late 18th century, the British colonized Malaysia,
imposing Western law and traditions on the region. The
British realized that for their control to be successful,
they not only had to conquer the physical space but
also alter the native’s thought system to be in line with
that of the British. The most significant transformation
enacted was the transition of KERJAAN to Kerajaan,
which implores a separation of church and state. British
colonial rule managed to create a secular government
through the conquest of epistemological space by trans-
forming the bureaucracy, judiciary, and the education
system.
Unlike many other colonialist takeovers, Malaysia
was non-violent. Britain established itself gradually first
through indirect intervention. Slowly but surely, they
began infringing on areas within the Malay sultans’ do-
main. First, with the Pangkor Treaty. Enacted in 1784, it
gave the British full authority over Malaysia and was
signed by the Malay sultans. The treaty stipulated that
all areas excluding Islam and custom were now secular
matters. Hence, the sultans relinquished their legisla-
tive and political control. Also included in the deal was
that sultans should provide a residence for a British
officer, referred to as "the Resident," and his advice
should be called upon regarding all matters exclud-
ing religion and adat (custom.) Despite this outlined
divide, the British ultimately managed to control and
regulate much religious and customary issues because
these were under the jurisdiction of local chiefs and
rulers who had essentially become British puppets.
Furthermore, the British conducted religious, admin-
istrative reform that limited the jurisdiction and inde-
pendence of Islamic qadis (judges) in comparison to
civic judges. All senior judges were appointed by the
British Resident General, whose superiors were trained
in the British law system. Thus, they referred to En-
glish law instead of Shariah law, as was the case before
colonialism. During the colonial period, all legislation
and policies introduced were derived from British rule.
Thus, the British used their influence to limit Sharia to
family law and implement the secular system1.
4 COLONIAL OPPOSITION AND THE RISE OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN MALAYSIA
British colonial rule did not continue without opposi-
tion. A nationalist movement was born with Islam as
its ideological platform, and there occurred a shift from
a western perspective to one with an Islamic focus. In
an attempt to maintain power, the British administra-
tion proposed the idea of Pan-Malayan Unity. How-
ever, the idea insulted Malay nationalists and sultans.
In response, the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) was formed in 1946. Malays acted in solidar-
ity and supported the party, including the ulamas who
did not believe it put enough emphasis on Islam, to rid
themselves of the British and Western imperialism. The
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) is the other notable
party that formed during this period. PAS, established
in 1951, originally began as a section within UNMO
but detached itself. It advocates for the creation of an
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Islamic State and still exists today as a major political
party and one of UMNO’s political opponents. UMNO
formed a coalition with Indian and Chinese political
parties known as the Alliance Party and won Malaysia’s
first elections. The coalition expanded to include more
political parties, and the Alliance Party became the Na-
tional Front Party (BN). UMNO was the leading politi-
cal party in Malaysia until 2018 when it lost its majority
parliamentary seats1.
5 POST-COLONIAL MALAYSIA AND
SEMI-DEMOCRACY
The Malaysian constitution shaped and conditioned
Malaysian Islam. It proclaims that every indigenous
Malay person is automatically considered a Muslim.
Therefore, religion is also an ethnic identifier. The con-
stitution also declares religious freedom; illustrating
the lasting influences of British colonialism in Malay
government and policies, specifically when it comes
to Sharia. Sharia courts still have jurisdiction but are
limited as they were under colonialism. Furthermore,
Sharia does not apply to non-Muslims and is con-
fined to family law. Sharia is also considered ‘colonial-
modern’ because it is highly fragmented and decen-
tralized, meaning how it is interpreted and carried out
varies locally1.
Since its independence, Malaysia has been consid-
ered a semi-democracy and considered as a model by
the western democratic world to be emulated by other
South Asian countries. The state has also been praised
for its ability to have democratic processes, and Islamic
values coexist alongside one another. Arguably, the
most exciting feature of Malaysian democracy has been
its societal pluralism. The British took advantage of the
societal pluralism and used it as part of their divide and
rule strategy. They gave the Malay aristocrats positions
in office and kept Malay peasants primarily confined
to agriculture, actively clogging social mobility. Under
these conditions, foreign Chinese were able to take hold
of the national economy through entrepreneurial ven-
tures. This dynamic created pluralist tensions, but in-
stead of resulting in conflict, they began the tradition
of accommodating elites, characterized by democratic
attributes such as consultation and representativeness.
Malaysia’s peaceful decolonization combined with this
tradition in accommodation resulted in regime stability,
allowing some democratic practices based on procedure
(polyarchy) to occupy a space where the majority of the
population is Muslim2.
The UMNO has interwoven aspects of hard and soft
democracy, forming a semi-democracy. Therefore, it has
been able to undermine democratic ideals and proce-
dures while maintaining just enough democratic symp-
toms to be still viewed as a democracy, at least from
an outside perspective. Electoral systems at the state
and federal level have been democratic and deemed
to be fair. Furthermore, political parties have been per-
mitted to elect their officers. However, they have been
methodically prevented from gaining the majority seats
in parliament. Additionally, electoral competitiveness
has been checked through a series of methods, such
as gerrymandering, permitting UMNO to maintain its
power. This semi-democracy has allowed for individ-
ual freedoms and expressions, though, serving to keep
the people and the opposition appeased enough not to
protest UMNO’s schemes. For example, political parties
are free to meet and organize and express dissent and
sometimes do gain seats in parliament2.
As aforementioned, Malaysia is a highly pluralist so-
ciety comprised of many ethnic communities that bene-
fit unevenly from economic growth. “However, it is not
societal pluralism that in itself weakens the viability of
democracy, but instead, the willingness of the elites to
exacerbate and exploit it”2. The UMNO used the eco-
nomic disparity between ethnicities to sustain its power
in the 1969 elections, triggering ethnic riots. From these
actions, the UMNO gained more control in its coalition
and established the New Economic Policy (NEP), which
aimed to strengthen the Malay middle-class, acquiring
on its behalf Chinese companies. It should be noted
that while the NEP initially intensified ethnic resent-
ments, it did encourage collaboration between Malay
and Chinese businesses and promoted Chinese educa-
tion and culture. And while ethnic sentiments in urban
areas eased due to NEP, they intensified in rural areas
as the economic benefits did not extend as drastically
in the periphery. During this period, the UMNO used
limited democracy as a tool to bend market-behavior
to its will while simultaneously laying the groundwork
for re-democratization by broadening the middle-class
along ethnic lines2.
In 1987, the UMNO finally faced a threatening op-
ponent when the party itself split into UMNO (Baru),
headed by the Prime Minister Mahathir, and Seman-
gat ‘46 led by the former finance minister, Razaleigh.
Razaleigh appealed to the middle-class, calling for more
democracy, and assuring if he were elected a two-party
system would be installed, the government would be
held accountable and an independent judiciary system
that would rid the country of policies promoting fa-
voritism and patronage. UMNO (Baru) did manage to
win the 1987 presidential elections at the party’s general
assembly, but Razaleigh’s supporters tried to invalidate
the election through media and judiciary efforts. Ma-
hathir responded by closing down certain newspapers
and jailing some supporters. The significance of these
actions is paramount as it demonstrated UMNO’s will-
ingness to limit freedoms guaranteed by democracy
to retain its power. That being said, these events also
resulted in increasing factionalism within the govern-
ment. Hence, the period leading up to the 1990 election
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was defined by greater electoral competitiveness2.
Socioeconomic policies, along with favorable atti-
tudes by the elites, enabled re-democratization during
the 1988-90 period. Prime Minister Mahathir allowed
Semangat ’46 to register as a party to compete in the
1990 election along with other political parties such as
PAS and the Democratic Action Party (DAP). These
parties were not allowed in the mainstream media but
were admitted to travel the country and give speeches,
demonstrating democratic openness. However, despite
this demonstration, Mahathir’s commitments to democ-
racy were questioned when debating if he would accept
electoral defeat. However, Mahathir’s dedication went
untested in the 1990 elections as he and his party were
victorious, and the vote was deemed to be fair2.
Indeed, after examining the 1990 election, many jus-
tifiably assumed that Malaysia was on its way to be-
coming more democratic with a more competitive party
system. Further increasing the expectation for democ-
racy were the other countries democratizing toward the
end of the 20th century after the disintegration of the
communist bloc. Unfortunately, the UMNO’s actions
during 1991-92 dispelled this notion because its 1990
electoral victory was too close for comfort. It began us-
ing state-owned media as a tool to implicate and demo-
nize oppositional party leaders and censored them in
the press, effectively preventing them from expressing
and distributing their opinions. Furthermore, UMNO
penalized other parties’ family members and their busi-
nesses. During Mahathir’s time as Prime Minister, he
continued to justify his actions to remain in power2.
To summarize, during the post-colonial period, there
have been many reasons for thinking that Malaysia
would transition from a semi-democracy into a more
comprehensive one. These include “an enlarged middle
class, improved ethnic relations, a facilitative interna-
tional milieu, and an apparent elite willingness to act
favorably on these conditions”2. However, UMNO’s
actions, especially during the 1991-92 period, dis-
pelled these notions and instead confined and limited
Malaysian democracy, only implementing varying de-
grees at their discretion2.
6 THE RISE OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA
Malaysia is an anomaly because Islam and secularism
have managed to coexist within its borders since its
independence. However, the relationship has proven
difficult to balance as the question remains: what is the
supreme law of the land3? Indeed, evidence suggests
that towards the end of the 20th century, the balance
has shifted in favor of Islam.
The 1970s and 80s marked a revived interest in re-
ligion. Islamization efforts characterized the decade.
These efforts did result in an increase in Malay-Muslim
militant activities, but because they were non-violent,
Malaysian Islam has been labeled moderate. The Is-
lamic Revival movement of the 70s and 80s led to Is-
lamization on the structural and societal levels, and
Malaysian Islam was able to reestablish itself, intermix-
ing with the plural, the secular, and the modern.
The last three UMNO prime ministers, Mahathir,
Badawi, and Najib proclaimed that Malaysia was al-
ready an Islamic State, although it can be argued they
did so only to compete with the oppositional party, PAS,
who had gained a significant following for their advo-
cation of an Islamic state. It is also speculated that they
made these claims to defend their policies, proclaiming
their Islamic nature, repeatedly referring to Article 3,
which declares that Islam is the religion of the Federa-
tion. This endorsement and attempt to assert that policy
is rooted in Islam acts as evidence that secular laws are
viewed as contradictory to Islamic ones by a significant
portion of the Malay-Muslim population3.
The Malaysian pluralist legal system is made up of
High Courts, which are non-religious, and a network
of Sharia courts which are limited to family law of
Muslims. The High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction,
and the Shariah courts operate within that jurisdic-
tion, meaning they can intervene and overrule deci-
sions made in the religious court. This has created a
hierarchical relationship between the two. In 1998, this
hierarchy was blurred with the new article 121(1A),
which reaffirmed that the civil and religious courts act
independently of one another. However, this sparked
controversy because of multiple overlapping areas. One
especially significant of these overlapping areas is the
issue of religious freedom and apostasy4.
Article 3(1) asserts that Islam is the religion of the
Federation. Until recently, it was agreed upon that this
article was not meant to establish an Islamic state, but
merely for symbolic purposes and to honor the coun-
try’s history. Recently, there has been resistance to the
constitution and calls to shift from prioritizing the state
to prioritizing Islam. The argument being that the state
has no right to legislate upon Islamic laws. Increasingly,
the High Courts have ruled in favor of Sharia court deci-
sions when cases have been appealed to them. Through
these cases, we can see article 121(1A) come into con-
flict with section 11(1), which asserts religious freedom
— for example, the case of Lina Joy. Joy was raised by
Malay-Muslim parents and is ethnically Malay and,
therefore, by default Muslim. She converted to Catholi-
cism and was engaged to a Catholic man. However,
because she was Muslim in the eyes of Malaysian law,
she could not marry her fiancé unless he converted
to Islam. Joy sought the recognition of her conversion
and took the case to the supposedly secular High Court.
When the High Court refused to acknowledge her trans-
formation, she took her case to the Court of Appeal and
finally, the Federal Court, who also rejected her applica-
tion. These actions reveal a restrictive interpretation of
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religious freedom at both the spiritual and the federal
courts, illustrating a growing Islamization of society
and the judicial system. What we are witnessing is a
movement calling for a reversal of priorities, favoring
Islamic norms over secular ones, and the increasing
ability of Islamic laws to regulate secular ones, placing
the rights and freedoms of non-Malay-Muslims in a
precarious state4.
In 2006, Malaysian politics were thrown into chaos
not only because of the highly divisive and contested
elections (which are characteristic of Malaysian elec-
tions since the 90s) but because of confrontations con-
cerning religion’s role in the country. Over the last two
decades, there has formed a growing division between
the Malays who think that Islam should be more inte-
grated into the public sphere and the Malays who be-
lieve the two should remain separate. On May 14, 2006,
an Article 11 forum was held in Penang, hosted by a
group of human rights and advocacy groups to promote
awareness of religious freedom rights. The conference
was rapidly shut down due to protesting by conserva-
tive Muslim groups, including PAS and FORKAD. Both
groups believed their position in Malaysian society was
being threatened by the other3. Enforcing Article 11 is
seen by many as a threat to Islamic revivalism. Fearing
another incident like the race riots in 1969 and sens-
ing the “growing discontent of the reactionary Muslim
groups,” the Prime Minister Badawi ceased these “con-
stitutional discussions”2.
7 2018 ELECTIONS: A NEW RULING PARTY
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR MALAYSIA
The true indicator of a democracy is a peaceful transi-
tion of power to a newly elected party. Mahathir, the
former prime minister of UNMO and the current leader
of PH, ran against UMNO’s current prime minister Na-
jib Razak. On May 9, 2018, Malaysia underwent a trans-
formative election wherein UMNO, the ruling political
party since Malaysia gained its independence in 1957,
and the National Front Party (BN) were unseated by the
new opposition party Alliance of Hope (PH). However,
whether or not this election will reframe Malaysian so-
ciety is yet to be determined. UMNO and the BN’s fall
from grace can be attributed to five factors including
corruption, government officials’ personal enrichment,
"stagnation in quality of living and unpopular economic
policies"5, UMNO’s use of repression and buying sup-
port, and social media’s role in drawing attention to
issues and serving as a platform for discussion and
debate5.
The UMNO and the National Front Party have been
accused of buying support, and many have speculated
that they owe their previous electoral victories to neo-
patrimonialism. Furthermore, through money politics
(promises, payoffs, resource rents, etc.) UMNO has been
able to spend more on elections and campaigning than
any of its opposition. Repression of democracy, laws,
and media have also provided the resistance with sig-
nificant obstacles in gaining support and influence. Ex-
plored in previous sections, the UMNO was able to hold
its position for so long by arresting opposition mem-
bers, limiting their activities and resources, and control-
ling the information in the media. Most significantly,
the electoral process itself was rigged through tactics
such as gerrymandering and not giving postal voters
enough time to send in their votes. The violations of the
electoral process did not go unnoticed on the national
or international level and significantly contributed to
BN’s weakening legitimacy. In 2018, Malaysia ranked
142nd out of the 158 countries featured in the Electoral
Integrity Project’s Global Perceptions of Electoral In-
tegrity (PEI). Malaysia’s remarkably low ranking made
it impossible for BN to convince the country that proper
electoral procedures had been followed5.
Corruption has existed within the bureaucracy for
years, and Mahathir had his fair share of scandals dur-
ing his tenure. However, Najib’s scandals were more
widespread, and there existed increased awareness and
concern regarding said corruption. There was a com-
mon perception that UMNO bureaucrats were enrich-
ing themselves while abandoning their constituents
who were facing growing inequalities, thus provoking
them. The 1MBD scandal shone a light on corruption
in UMNO and played a significant role in Najib’s undo-
ing. The population suspected party leaders of illegally
lining their own pockets with state funds, specifically
those of Najib and his family’s. Social media’s role in
propagating the scandal should be noted as it relayed to
citizens the extent of corruption within the government.
Social media is a powerful tool against censorship, of
which state-owned media is vulnerable. The scandal
also exposed a lack of accountability in the government
as UMNO made no investigation efforts. Politicians of
opposing parties, such as Mahathir and Anwar, have
been very vocal with their criticism regarding the scan-
dal and the lack of investigation. Additionally, there
were concerns about foreign money’s influence in the
country. Najib received funds from Saudi Arabia, leav-
ing people to speculate what Najib did to deserve such
a generous donation5.
Despite the years of undermining democracy and
using immoral and unethical tactics to stay in power,
there was little expectation that PH would be able to
unseat UMNO and BN. This is because, between 2008
and 2015, notable differences emerged among the mem-
ber parties of PH, one of them being PAS, and many
thought it doubtful that they would be able to work
together toward a common goal. However, because
elections leading to democratization are dependent on
the relative weakness of the ruling party compared to
the oppositional parties, one can easily see why PH
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was able to overcome its perceived lack of compatibil-
ity and overtake the majority votes. The United Malay
National Organization and the National Front Party’s le-
gitimacy had weakened to the point that not even their
past tactics could save them. Now remains the ques-
tion of whether the new ruling party and Mahathir are
genuinely committed to reform. Mahathir contributed
to and initiated many un-democratic means, including
exploiting ethnic grievances and checking electoral com-
petitiveness, to keep himself and the UMNO in power.
Furthermore, both he and Ibrahim Anwar, the current
leader of the People’s Justice Party (in the PH coali-
tion), contributed to Islamization at the fundamental
and agency level. While he and his party have seem-
ingly moved away from a race-based focus, time will
only tell if he and his party are different5.
Malaysia’s reform and possible democracy are also
dependent on Mahathir’s relationships with the PH
coalition’s party leaders, which have been marred in
the past. In 1982, when Mahathir was Prime Minister,
Anwar became Vice President of UMNO. Anwar was
popular among other leaders within the party, caus-
ing Mahathir to worry about his influence. Through-
out Anwar’s tenure, he and Mahathir were in constant
competition, disagreeing over everything. Eventually,
Anwar was fired and arrested under the Internal Secu-
rity Act. Following his imprisonment, the government
launched a destructive PR campaign on his reputation.
Various other party leaders in PH were arrested during
Mahathir’s tenure. Thus, there is an obvious need for
trust-building among the heads of the parties and Ma-
hathir if PH is to be successful. Leading up to the elec-
tions, there seemed a willingness to cooperate; however,
the dynamic among government personnel is question-
able5.
On May 16, 2019, Anwar gave a speech warning
against corruption that is already taking hold of the
party, though he did not name specific politicians. He
also implored citizens to remind leaders against exces-
sive displays of wealth. In the same speech, Anwar an-
nounced that when he takes over as prime minister, he
will uphold Islamic principles but "will also show con-
cern and love for our brothers and sisters among non-
Muslims. . . that are loyal to us.” The speech suggests
a continued allegiance to reform and to fight against
corruption and respect Islam while maintaining the
rights of religious freedom. However, it could also be
a strategy to make the public doubtful of individual
government leaders and serve as a reminder to the pub-
lic and Mahathir, of Mahathir’s promise that Anwar
would be the next prime minister6.
8 CONCLUSION
Malaysia’s unique history is defined by cultural inter-
actions that combined Islam and British colonialism,
which brought democratic practices and secularism to
the region, and allowed ideas considered incompatible
to operate within the same space. While Malaysia’s abil-
ity to implement secularism and democracy among a
majority Muslim population has been applauded by the
West and used as evidence that Islam and democracy
can coexist, closer examination reveals a tumultuous
relationship where democratic ideals have been increas-
ingly sacrificed.
As outlined throughout the paper, the United Malays
National Organization continued the British tradition
of playing on ethnic tensions to divide and distract so-
ciety as a strategy to maintain its power. Its preference
and favoritism of Malays disguised by ethnonational-
ism as well as allowing for increasing Islamization in
public and political spheres enabled UMNO to keep
the 2/3 majority in parliament for 61 years. Indeed,
the UMNO used identity as a tactic, playing on Malay
fears that other races would take away their rights. As
a result, there have been increasing calls for Islam on
behalf of the Malay-Muslim population. Fearing the
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party gaining support, UMNO
gradually conceded to keep the people appeased and to
minimize PAS’s electoral threat. Thus, under the United
Malay National Organization, Malaysia slowly began
its conversion from a secular state to an Islamic one.
Matathir’s new party leading up to the election was
seen as a reliable alternative for Malays because of its
focus on reform, righting the economy and apparent
commitment to government accountability. Also, the
coalition with multiple parties representing different
sections of society suggests that the re-democratization
that was thought would happen after the 1990 elec-
tions will occur now, characterized by meaningful elec-
tions and equal representation for all Malaysian citizens.
Whether the Alliance of Hope party will be able to fulfill
its promises and if the people’s hopeful beliefs will be
actualized can only be determined in time and through
careful observation of PH’s actions5. If PH’s leaders
are genuinely committed to reform and can put behind
them past grievances, then it is reasonable to hypoth-
esize a decline in Islamization and a return to secular
norms in the political, judicial and social arenas with
aspects of Islam that still respect the religious freedom
of all guaranteed by the constitution.
9 EDITOR’S NOTES
This article was written in Spring 2019. Developments
have occurred in the political arena regarding Islam and
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